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Abstract 
The catastrophic explosion that occurred at Texas City on 23 March 2005 during the start-up of the 
raffinate splitter resulted in an estimated 15 deaths and 180 injuries. Since the incident, several 
studies have investigated the root causes of the disaster. Some contributing factors to the incident 
include wider organisational, process safety management, and human elements. There have also 
been some attempts to model the sequence of events before the incident, and the consequences of 
the resulting fires and explosions. 
This study provides a dynamic model of the sequence of events leading up to the incident and 
replicates the reported process variables during the isomerisation unit start-up on the day of the 
incident. The resulting simulation model is used as the framework for a dynamic hazard and 
operability (HAZOP) study. 
Keywords 
Texas City, Dynamic simulation, HAZOP, Process Hazard Analysis 
Introduction 
The explosion that occurred at BP’s Texas City Refinery on 23 March 2005 remains one of the most 
catastrophic incidents in the history of the process industries. The explosion resulted in the deaths of 
15 persons, and over 180 were injured. It is estimated that economic losses of up to US$1.5 billion 
resulted from the incident and subsequent follow-up efforts at reconstruction. This incident has been 
the subject of several process safety analyses. Lessons learned from the incident investigation have 
been used by process industries around the world for improving technical safety performance, and 
for developing better process safety management processes. The US Chemical Safety Board (US 
CSB, 2005) reports that the incident was due to organisational and safety deficiencies at all levels of 
the organisation as warning signs were present for many years. 
The incident happened as the raffinate splitter section of the isomerisation unit (ISOM unit) was 
being re-started after a turnaround maintenance. Evidence suggests that the start-up process was 
being carried out contrary to instructions in BP’s start-up procedures following major turnaround 
maintenance work. The operators proceeded to fill the raffinate tower with hydrocarbon liquid feed 
for over three hours with no liquid outflow from the tower. This resulted in the tower overfilling and 
overheating as a result of thermal liquid expansion. In addition to operator negligence and error, 
incorrect functioning of critical instrumentation and control devices also contributed to the 
catastrophic explosion. 
Although the accident occurred over 10 years ago, valuable lessons have been deduced from 
analysing the operational and process design errors that led to the catastrophic loss of containment 
and subsequent explosion. The incident is widely used as an important case study in academic 
circles, and informs the process safety management approach adopted in many high profile 
chemical process industries. Numerous published academic papers on the subject also exist. 
This work aims to extend the application of the lessons learned from the incident by offering an 
approach to hazard and operability studies that will contribute to safer operations in the process 
industries. The UK Health and Safety Executive acknowledges the need to “engage an industry 
whose performance in risk management and control is not what it should be” (HSE, 2007). The 
methodology used involves an initial dynamic simulation of the sequence of events leading up to the 
explosion using commercially available process simulation software. This is followed by a further 
simulation scenario for the dynamic HAZOP study that explores an alternative sequence of events and 
the resulting consequences. 
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Literature review 
Shortly after the explosion occurred at Texas City, the US Chemical Safety Board initiated a 
thorough investigation that concluded with the publication of an investigation report in 2007. The 
report provides detailed accounts of the refinery’s operations, ISOM unit description, and technical 
details of the accident sequence. The CSB report also presented its findings on BP’s process safety 
management approach, and alluded to lapses in the company’s safety culture, and a lack of 
management commitment to process safety improvement. Amongst other things, the report identified 
a flawed management of change process which meant that temporary trailers were located too close 
to the ISOM and NDU (Naptha Desulphurisation) units. Another concern raised by the report was the 
poor implementation and close-out of actions arising from process hazard analysis (PHA) studies. 
The Baker panel report (Baker et al. 2007) commissioned by BP was also published in 2007. The 
report offered 10 recommendations for process safety improvement in the process industries. It is 
noteworthy that most of the recommendations from the CSB and Baker panel reports have been 
adopted across the process industries around the globe. For instance, there is considerable emphasis 
on identifying and managing relevant process safety metrics (process safety performance indicators) 
as opposed to occupational safety data that give no indication of the process safety performance of a 
facility. However, a lot more needs to be done in order to achieve the aspiration of transforming the 
process industries into high reliability organisations. 
A dynamic model of the events leading up to the Texas City refinery explosion is presented by 
Palacin-Linan (2005) and implemented in gPROMS. Palacin-Linan argues that because of the 
complexity of the distillation column operation on the day of the incident, it is not possible to replicate 
the sequence of events using commercially available simulation tools such as Aspen HYSYS or 
UNISIM. However, on the day of the incident, there was no distillation taking place in the column as it 
was simply being filled with liquid ( Manca and Brambilla, 2012). Commercial simulators thus provide 
the capability to replicate the column filling dynamics, with reasonable approximations of the vapour- 
liquid equilibria at the published heating rates and the physico-chemical properties of the column 
components. In addition to a dynamic simulation of the column filling dynamics, Manca and Brambila 
unsuccessfully attempted to simulate the dynamics of the two-phase flow of sub-cooled liquid in the 
blowdown pipe using the Homogenous Equilibrium Model, HEM. The inability to successfully explain 
the dynamics of events downstream of the pressure relief valves (PRVs) is attributed to missing 
critical information such as the type of PRVs, and the inlet and outlet process conditions to the PRVs. 
Although it is suggested that future research efforts be focused on using alternative models to explain 
the complete evolution of the accident dynamics, it is doubtful that such work will inherently provide 
substantial value in improving process safety. It is therefore not the intention of this paper to 
extrapolate or validate the results of dynamic process simulations of the Texas City explosion. In fact, 
close examination of the different failed barriers that led to the catastrophic explosion will reveal that 
concentrating efforts at making sure that process safety barriers (both passive and active barriers) 
function on demand is far more beneficial. The initial step in having the right barriers is the correct 
identification of the hazards present in the process from the design phase and throughout the asset 
lifecycle. 
A few technical publications have attempted to model the impacts of the accident in order to quantify 
the resulting damage from the fires and explosions. Khan and Amyotte (2007) adopt a consequence 
modelling approach that uses the quantitative risk assessment methodology to quantify the extent of 
damage from fires and explosions following the incident. Similarly, Kalantarnia et al. (2010) describe a 
predictive model that uses the Texas City explosion event for consequence assessment as a useful 
tool to forecast the impacts of loss of containment incidents. 
One of the outcomes of the Baker panel report into the Texas City refinery incident is the 
recommendation that robust process hazard analysis (PHA) is carried out on process plants. Hazard 
and operability (HAZOP) study is regarded as one of such PHA tools for the systematic identification 
and assessment of process and operability hazards (Herbert, 2011). The effectiveness of a HAZOP 
team depends on the creativity and experience of the participants in discovering unforeseen effects 
that might result in a major accident. This is no easy task as the team works with final design 
documents prepared by clever engineers who would have thought of most credible hazard scenarios. 
In addition to being creative, the team therefore needs to be highly critical in order to identify latent 
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errors in design. To do this, the team must systematically probe the process design in a sustained 
manner over many hours of debating process design errors. 
It has been suggested (Mahnken, 2001) that case histories from previous accidents can be a 
powerful tool in stimulating and sustaining the creativity of HAZOP team members. Mahnken 
suggests that in addition to presenting the basic sequence of events of the incident, a hypothetical 
HAZOP worksheet that illustrates how the accident might have been foreseen in a HAZOP study 
should also be considered. Kletz (1999) argued that “It is better to illuminate the hazards we have 
passed through than not illuminate them at all, as we may pass the same way again, but we should 
try to see them before we meet them…unfortunately, we do not always learn from the hazards we 
have passed through.” It is therefore the intention of this paper to explore a method for illuminating 
the hazards inherent in distillation column operations, and initiate a discussion on the usefulness of 
dynamic HAZOPs in promoting management buy-in in the often expensive process of satisfactorily 
closing out PHA recommendations. 
The HAZOP methodology is a qualitative industry best practice procedure for identifying and 
controlling process safety hazards. Like other PHA tools, HAZOPs help to identify unacceptable 
hazards. They do not reduce the hazards to acceptable levels. Reducing the hazards only happens 
when HAZOP actions are effectively closed out. However, because it involves considerable 
investment of time, money and personnel to close out HAZOP actions, it is usually not given top 
priority. The challenge for process safety practitioners, therefore, is to ensure that management 
support is obtained and necessary resources are committed into closing out PHA recommendations. 
Unlike other PHA tools such as Layers of Protection or Fault Tree Analysis, HAZOP studies do not 
quantify risk levels (as this is not the primary aim of a HAZOP). Typically, high hazard scenarios 
identified during a HAZOP study are subjected to more rigorous PHA studies such as LOPA and the 
required Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is identified to mitigate the identified hazard. This is often a 
lengthy process. Johnson (2010) proposes the use of a combined HAZOP/LOPA study to 
immediately quantify the risk reductions possible with available safeguards and assign a target SIL. 
This approach, according to Johnson, will avoid the duplication of efforts involved in conducting 
separate HAZOP and LOPA studies. The practical application of this approach is however doubtful 
as the HAZOP process is inherently time consuming and requires focused deliberation over a 
lengthy period of time in order to correctly identify hazards. 
Traditional versus Dynamic HAZOP  
In a traditional HAZOP study, hazardous scenarios are identified by an experienced team of multi-
discipline engineers and operations personnel. This is done through a combination of guidewords and 
parameters, for specific sections of the plant under consideration, called nodes. Examples of 
guidewords used in a HAZOP study include No, More, Less, As Well As, and Reverse while 
parameters include flow, pressure, composition and temperature. Possible guideword and parameter 
combinations for a brainstorming session are “No Flow”, or “More Temperature”. This rigorous and 
time-consuming approach to hazardous scenario identification helps the study team to identify 
deviations from the original design intent. 
For each hazardous scenario, possible causes are identified. The likelihood and severity of the 
resulting risk is determined qualitatively based on the experience and judgment of the HAZOP team. 
Finally, the team assesses the safeguards and mitigations in place to prevent the realisation of the 
hazardous scenario, and generates recommendations for further risk reduction where necessary.  
Several limitations of the traditional HAZOP methodology have been enumerated. In his critique of the 
HAZOP study method, Baybutt (2015) points out that the reliance on team brainstorming presents 
both benefits and drawbacks. Although group brainstorming stimulates creative thinking, team 
members continue contemplating on the issues raised following formal HAZOP sessions. Some 
individuals may thus generate additional creative ideas on their own. In HAZOP – Guide to Best 
Practice (1995), the authors point out that the HAZOP study is not an infallible method of identifying 
every possible hazard or operability problem that could arise during actual operating conditions. This 
is corroborated by published information identifying hazardous scenarios that led to catastrophic 
events that were not picked up in a traditional HAZOP study (Krishnan, 2005).  
In a Dynamic HAZOP, a process simulation of the process under consideration (in whole or in part) is 
combined with the traditional HAZOP as an aid to hazardous scenario identification and risk 
assessment. This reduces the subjectivity involved in the determination of hazardous event severities 
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and likelihoods. Additionally, for processes involving chemical reactions and reactors, mathematical 
modelling combined with process simulation can further reduce the subjectivity involved in traditional 
HAZOPs by accurately depicting the effects of complex mechanisms and coupled phenomena 
(Svandova, et al., 2005).  
The Dynamic HAZOP has been proposed as a possible methodology for the accurate identification of 
hazardous scenarios and their corresponding risks during process hazard analysis studies 
(Svandova, et al., 2005; Labovsky et al., 2007).  Such an approach is useful for the accurate 
identification of consequences for some deviations. Although it is suggested that combining a 
dynamic simulation with the traditional HAZOP can significantly reduce the time and effort required in 
HAZOP studies (Labovsky et al., 2007), it is improbable that this would be the case in practice. Even 
when a process simulation of the process under consideration already exists, usually as part of 
process design activities, considerable time and effort will be required to investigate alternative 
operating scenarios using the simulation.  
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Dynamic simulation of raffinate splitter 
The simulation of the sequence of events that led to the catastrophic explosions at the BP Texas City 
refinery is based on the hypothesis that the raffinate splitter (distillation column) overfilled. 
Subsequently, liquid in the column spilled over the top into the overhead pipe, leading to over 
pressurisation and opening of the relief valves upstream of the blowdown vessel. The simulation 
approach adopted in this study replaces the distillation column model in Aspen HYSYS with a tank 
separator. Prior to the explosion on 23 March 2005 at 01:13pm, it is reported that the column was 
completely liquid full (flooded) with a layer of sub-cooled liquid at the top, with the condenser and 
reflux drum filled with pressurised nitrogen. No vapour flowed out of the column, and there was no 
reflux into the column. Indeed, laboratory tests of liquid samples recovered from the column feed, 
bottoms product, and overhead samples demonstrated that no separation took place in the column on 
the day of the incident (US CSB, 2005). This justifies the approach used in this study where the 
distillation tower is replaced with a tank separator that is simply filling up with liquid feed. It has also 
been suggested that the behaviour of the vapour generated in the column on the day of the incident 
cannot be accurately predicted, as the prevailing process conditions are outside the range of standard 
empirical models of distillation tray separation available in commercial simulation packages such as 
Aspen HYSYS. 
The tank separator is modelled as a vertical vessel with a total liquid volume of 583 m3. The volume 
of the separator is taken as the difference between the total internal volume of the actual distillation 
column less the volume occupied by column internals such as trays, weirs and downcomers (Manca 
and Brambilla, 2012). The dynamic simulation sought to demonstrate the following: Liquid over-fill in 
the distillation column; Liquid thermal expansion in the column as a result of feed pre-heat; and feed 
vaporisation dynamics in the distillation column. According to data provided by BP (Palacin-Linan, 
2005), the feed to the column was a mixture of 35 light hydrocarbons. However, for the purpose of 
this simulation, the components have been lumped into four hydrocarbon categories; C5, C6, C7 and 
C8. All the components with 5 carbon atoms have been lumped in the C5 category, while components 
with 6, 7 and 8 carbon atoms have been lumped into the hexane, heptanes and octane categories. In 
addition to hydrocarbons, nitrogen is included in the components list as nitrogen was used to 
pressurise and test the system for leaks prior to the introduction of hydrocarbon feed. Also, water is 
included in the component list, as the column was steamed out following nitrogen purge. 
The process flow sheet (PFS) used for the dynamic simulation is shown in Figure 1 (adapted from 
Manca and Brambilla, 2012). It comprises the tank separator used to model the distillation column 
and a simple TEE separator used to simulate the separation of light raffinate from nitrogen used to 
pressurise the system prior to the introduction of feed. For the purpose of dynamic simulation, two 
flow control valves are included in the flow sheet: FIC-1 is used to control the inflow of feed into the 
column, and FIC-2 is used to control the outflow of product from the column. The actual distillation 
column had a level controller for manipulating the flow of product from the bottom of the column to 
storage but on the day of the incident, this level controller malfunctioned.  
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Figure 1: Process Flowsheet for dynamic simulation 
The initial conditions used for the steady state simulation are those available in published documents 
about the process conditions at the start-up of the raffinate splitter tower on 23 March at the end of 
the turn-around maintenance (Palacin-Linan, 2005; US Chemical Safety Board, 2005, Baker, 
Levenson, and Bowman, 2007). The simulation covers the period from 0213hrs to 1320hrs on 23 
March 2005, corresponding to the time raffinate feed was introduced into the tower and when the 
explosion occurred, respectively.  
The first simulation is for the sequence of events from 0213hrs to 1000hrs when the night shift crew 
started introducing raffinate feed into the raffinate splitter from the aromatics recovery unit. Because 
of variations in the reported feed rate to the column during the start-up procedure, an average feed 
flowrate of 16.3 Kg/s was used for the simulation. An isothermal temperature regime is assumed for 
this stage of the simulation as no heat input to the splitter is reported. The feed enters the column at a 
temperature of 23°C. Following crew changeover at 0 600hrs, the raffinate splitter start-up procedure 
was resumed at approximately 1000hrs on the morning of 23 March, 2005. At this stage, the fuel gas 
supply to the reboiler furnace was initiated and the first two burners were lit. Feed pre-heat 
subsequently occurred by convective heat transfer in the top section of the furnace, increasing the 
temperature of the feed at a rate of 8.5°C per hour . During this period in the start-up sequence, the 
level control valve (LCV) at the outlet of the raffinate splitter remained closed, contrary to BP’s start-
up procedures. The correct procedure required that the level control valve was left at 50% open in 
automatic mode, to establish heavy raffinate flow to storage. Operators had previously complained 
that leaving the level at 50% was not ideal (contrary to what is stated in the start-up procedure). They 
maintained that if the level was left at 50%, a drop in liquid level could result in completely loosing 
heavy raffinate flow from the tower, resulting in a trip to the feed supply, and costly interruption to the 
start-up procedure.  
A dynamic simulation of the overall tower filling dynamics from 1000 to 1320 when the explosion 
occurred revealed that the feed to the column vaporised at approximately 1310 hrs. This happened as 
a result of the additional heat input into the column though the feed-product heat exchanger. The 
liquid level in the column from 1000hrs to 1320 hrs is shown in Figure 2.  
 
© 2017. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
7 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Column liquid filling dynamics 
The dynamics of the feed vapourisation as the rate of feed pre-heat increased at 1300hrs is shown in 
Figure 3. The feed completely vaporises at 1310hrs. This is expected to occur and agrees with 
reported observations on the day of the incident, and from simulation results by other researchers.  
 
 
Figure 3: Feed vapourisation dynamics 
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The overall feed temperature increase obtained from the dynamic simulation is shown in figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Feed temperature dynamics 
 
Dynamic HAZOP Case Study 
In order to extend the use of the dynamic simulation, an additional simulation scenario was 
investigated. It has been established that the simulation approach employed in this study is a tank 
model that replicates the dynamic filling of the raffinate splitter like it happened on the day of the 
incident. This approach is also used in the dynamic HAZOP study. The initial dynamic simulation has 
been used to establish that it is possible to replicate the column temperature and pressure profiles, 
and the liquid level dynamics observed on the day of the accident. 
The significance of this methodology is not in the rigorous simulation of the sequence of events, but in 
the extrapolation of the model for use in dynamic HAZOP studies. It can be argued that the benefits 
obtainable from such an approach exceed whatever gain may be obtained from developing more 
accurate models. Such benefits include a visual representation of the quantified level of risks resulting 
from incorrectly designed equipment, or not following adequate operational procedures. 
A conventional HAZOP involves using guidewords to qualitatively investigate the hazards and 
operability issues that would result from incorrect operations. Examples of such guidewords include 
“more flow”, “more temperature”, “no flow”, “less pressure”, and so on. For the purpose of this study 
the guideword used is “more temperature”. According to the accident investigation report, the 
observed temperature profile occurred as a result of heat input from two burners in the reboiler which 
were lit at approximately 1000hrs.Two additional burners were lit at 1117hrs. The HAZOP scenario 
explored in this study therefore considers the case where increased heat input to the column began at 
1000hrs with all four burners lit. A qualitative assessment of this scenario would obviously identify the 
associated hazards of increased temperature input and likely overpressure of the column. Appropriate 
safeguards would be the pressure relief valves and the blowdown drum and stack which will protect 
the column from any overpressure scenario. The additional lapses that occurred on the day of the 
incident such as leaving the LCV at the bottom of the column closed are also included in this 
scenario. The resulting dynamic process conditions from this simulation are shown in figures 5 to 7. 
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Figure 5: Dynamic HAZOP liquid level dynamics 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Dynamic HAZOP feed temperature dynamics 
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Figure 7: Dynamic HAZOP feed vapourisation dynamics 
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Discussion & Conclusion 
The observed temperature profile obtained from Aspen HYSYS dynamic simulation closely matches 
that reported by the simulations of Manca and Brambilla (2012) which was implemented in UNISIM. 
At 1300hrs, the feed temperature had risen to 48.5°C, and the vapour fraction was 0.015. At 1:12pm, 
the liquid level obtained from the dynamic simulation was 47.9m, similar to a level of 48m at 1:02pm 
reported in the CSB report. At 1314hrs, it is reported that sub-cooled hydrocarbon liquids flowed out 
of the top of the column into the vertical overhead vapour line. At this stage, it is reported that the rate 
of temperature increase of the feed into the tower was at an additional 7.5 °C per minute. This is 
because the heavy raffinate product flow transferred additional heat to the feed through the feed-
product heat exchanger located upstream of the reboiler. This led to a situation where the column 
contained a stream of heated liquid at the bottom of the tower while a layer of cold liquid remained at 
the top section of the column. 
The dynamic simulation of the overall tower filling dynamics from 1000 to 1320 when the explosion 
occurred revealed that the feed to the column vaporised at approximately 1310 hrs. This happened as 
a result of the additional heat input into the column though the feed-product heat exchanger. 
Subsequently, thermal expansion of the liquid in the column led to the filling of the overhead 
vapour line with hydrocarbon liquids and an increase in pressure as a result of the 
hydrostatic liquid head. The pressure in the tower at this point is reported to have been 
about 63 psig. The combined liquid static head and the tower pressure led to an increase in 
pressure in the overhead vapour line higher than the relief valve lift set pressures of 40, 41, 
and 42 psig. Flammable hydrocarbon vapours subsequently flowed from the overhead line through 
the collection headers into the blowdown drum. It is reported that liquids flowed from the raffinate 
splitter tower into the blowdown vessel at a rate of 509, 500 gph, resulting in a discharge of 
approximately 51,900 galons of liquids into the blowdown drum in six minutes. Once the blowdown 
drum and stack overfilled, flammable liquid spilled to the ground and created a vapour cloud around 
the ISOM unit. The vapour cloud exploded at 1320hrs and the likely ignition source is reported to 
most likely have been an idling diesel pickup truck. 
The dynamic HAZOP simulation demonstrated an alternative pathway for the sequence of events 
leading up to the accident. At 12noon, an additional temperature increase of 43% occurred, leading to 
a mixed phase feed flow with a vapour fraction of 0.4. It is noteworthy that the rise in liquid level in the 
column is less than that which supposedly took place on the day of the incident. Complete 
vaporisation of the feed takes place at 1230pm in the alternative accident pathway, much earlier than 
the reported feed vaporisation time on the day of the incident. 
The dynamic HAZOP in this study has demonstrated an alternative pathway for the evolution of 
process variables if additional safety barriers were breached on the day of the incident. Establishing 
the evolution of the process variables downstream of the column has not been considered in this 
study. However, it has been demonstrated that a dynamic HAZOP may help secure management 
buy-in by demonstrating the likely consequences of deviations from standard operating procedures or 
other hazards in process plants. As the additional time and effort required for further deliberation 
using the results of a dynamic simulation during a HAZOP study can make an already exacting 
process more onerous, it is recommended that this activity is completed as part of the preparatory 
phase of a HAZOP study.  
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